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Concepts that refer to vital energy are represented 
in many cultures. In India, it is referred to as prana, a 
life-sustaining force of living beings (Amritanshuram, 
Nagendra, Shastry, Raghuram, & Nagarathna, 2013). In 
Afro-Brazilian religions it is referred to as axé, an invisible 
force that is magical and sacred and fundamental to all 
existence, both physical and spiritual (Cohen, 2007). In 
Chinese philosophy ch’i (qì) refers to an energetic fluid, 
which vitalizes the body, in particular as the breath, and 
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which circulates outside us as the air (Edwards, Hlongwane, 
Thwala, & Robinson, 2011).
In these and other examples, concepts of vital energy 
commonly cut across boundaries, affecting biological, 
mental, and spiritual conditions. These anthropological 
accounts suggest that concepts of vital force may be intuitive, 
widespread, and domain general.
The goal of this paper is to explore how an understanding 
of vital energy extends from a biological reasoning to spiritual 
thinking. More specifically, work in the field of Cognitive 
Science of Religion (CSR) will be reviewed, focusing on core 
concepts that emphasize an intuitive theory of mind as being 
the placeholder for beliefs in supernatural agency. Later a new 
approach emerging in the literature that challenges this focus 
on an intuitive theory of mind will be introduced (Cohen & 
Barrett, 2011). This new theoretical view first emphasizes 
personhood (agency) as holding different elements, mainly 
mentality (Mind), vitality (Vital Energy) and identity 
(Essence). Second, it suggests that these components are 
typically combined in conceptualizing a person but may be 
activated in different ways depending on varying concepts, 
contexts, and cultures. Finally, building on this new theoretical 
approach, an intuitive understanding of vital energy as being 
at the core of people’s intuitions of supernatural agency will be 
introduced, suggesting cross-cultural studies that explore the 
development of a causal-explanatory framework anchored on 
notions of vital energy.
Vital Energy and the Cognitive Science of Religion
The CSR field is centrally concerned with revealing the 
basic cognitive mechanisms that enable humans to develop 
religious beliefs and practices (Barrett, 2011; Boyer, 2001; 
McCauley & Cohen, 2010). In this quest, empirical work has 
strongly converged to study what constitutes the basic cognitive 
underpinnings that drive belief in supernatural concepts. A 
wealth of studies have pointed out that these beliefs are initially 
anchored in intuitive concepts, that later extend to supernatural 
practices and beliefs (Boyer, 2001). Hence many studies in the 
field have set out to identify the specific core intuitive concepts 
that are at the root of such supernatural ideas, borrowing heavily 
from a theory-theory theoretical approach and from previous 
research in the field of cognitive development.
Theoretical Positions in CSR: Supernatural Agency and 
Theory of Mind
Traditionally, social science research on religion 
predominantly focused on observing and describing the 
seemingly endless variety of religious beliefs and practices 
across cultures and throughout history. The CSR discipline 
has developed a different approach, leaning towards the 
study of shared cognitive mechanisms (Bering, 2002).
The core idea is that religious concepts are understood as 
being the natural product of ordinary cognitive processes. Barrett 
(2011) described this perspective as the ‘naturalness-of-religion 
thesis’ claiming that religion is explained by ordinary cognition 
plus the exposure to an ordinary environment. Thus the field of 
CSR is currently focused on three main issues: (a) how people 
represent supernatural concepts; (b) what are the intuitive 
cognitive foundations of these concepts and how they develop; 
and (c) how these intuitive concepts are later recruited in 
different cultural contexts.
Early theoretical elaborations in CSR focused 
on understanding what ties all seemingly discrepant 
manifestations of religious beliefs and practices together. 
Towards this end, Boyer (2001) has claimed that the common 
element that holds the diversity of religious and supernatural 
manifestations together is a belief in the existence of 
supernatural agents. Agents are defined as beings that 
possess mental features such as desires, beliefs, memories, 
intentions, and expectations whereas Supernatural Agents 
are depicted as beings that possess all such mental features, 
just like human agency, but that at the same time violate 
basic expectations of human agency, such as not possessing 
a physical body, or being able to fly and travel through 
walls. Boyer extends his claims by highlighting the attention 
grabbing potential of supernatural agents due to the fact that 
they violate basic expectations associated with our intuitive 
understanding of the world. Because agency is associated 
with mental characteristics, Boyer (2001) has claimed that 
“the only feature of humans that is always projected onto 
supernatural beings is the mind” (p. 163).
Given Boyer’s theoretical claim, cognitive 
anthropologists and empirical psychologists set to 
investigate its validity. These studies have focused on two 
key aspects of Boyer’s theoretical assumptions: First, on 
people’s intuitions of supernatural agency; and second, if 
these intuitions were being driven by an intuitive theory of 
mind. Thus many studies began to look at people’s intuitions 
of supernatural agents such as gods, ghosts (Barrett, 2011; 
Harris & Giménez, 2005) and souls (Richert & Harris, 2006, 
2008). An underlying common goal of these studies was to 
ascertain if in fact people’s intuitions of these agents were 
being driven by an implicit theory of mind. A selection of 
these studies is reviewed as follows.
It’s All About the Mind: A Case for an Intuitive Theory 
of Mind
To illustrate work in CSR regarding people’s intuitions 
over supernatural agents, empirical studies looking at the 
intuitions of children and adults over the afterlife will be 
initially presented. This research most clearly illustrates how 
an intuitive theory of mind readily provides the basis for 
inferences about the afterlife, depicting how the conceptions 
of the ordinary mind naturally lead to inferences about a 
disembodied life.
One of the widely cited studies in this area was performed 
by Bering and Bjorklund (2004). They asked North American 
children and adults to watch a puppet show in which an alligator 
eats a brown/white mouse. The mouse was presented as having 
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characteristics that are biological (eating, drinking water, 
growing up), psychobiological (thirst, hunger, feeling sleepy 
or sick), perceptual (e.g., hearing, tasting, smelling, sight), 
based on desire (e.g., wishing, wanting hoping), emotional 
(sad, angry, scared) and epistemic (thinking, believing, 
knowing). Following the puppet presentation, participants 
were questioned about the continuity versus discontinuity of 
these biological, psychobiological, perceptual, desire-based, 
emotional, and epistemic functions after the mouse was 
eaten by the alligator, thus after it had died. Results indicated 
that younger children, between ages 4-6, overall tended to 
provide a stronger continuity pattern of responses, indicating 
more frequently that all functions continue after the mouse’s 
death, while older children, between ages 6-8, and adults 
were more likely to assume the discontinuity of biological, 
psychobiological, and perceptual functioning in contrast to 
epistemic, emotional, and desire-based functioning. More 
specifically, however, young children’s continuity answers 
were mainly driven by their intuitions on mental kinds, 
leading them to attribute continuity of mental functioning 
after death. In contrast, the discontinued answers given by 
older children and adults seem to be strongly guided by their 
intuitive and reflective ideas on biology, which override their 
previous intuitions on the continuity of mind. This happens 
because they have had more exposure to teaching about 
biological functioning and its implications regarding life 
sustainability. But even with this decrease, the results still 
pointed out that the discontinuity reasoning of older children 
and adults is more likely to be applied to mental states that 
are linked to the body (perceptual and psychobiological) than 
to other mental states that are easily detached from the body 
(epistemic, emotional, and desire-based). These findings show 
that children and adults tend to infer the existence of mental 
functioning to agents even after their death, that is, even after 
they don’t possess a functioning body. The degree and the 
selective mental properties that are projected may vary with 
age, but nevertheless, participants still assumed that the dead 
mouse held some sort of mental functioning after death.
In another study, Bering (2002) looked at how participants’ 
explicit afterlife beliefs (i.e., extinctivist, agnostic, immortalist, 
reincarnationist, eclectic, and other believers) influence 
their intuitions of the continued functioning of biological, 
psychobiological, perceptual, desire-based, emotional, and 
epistemic states after death. In an interview designed to elicit 
implicit intuitions, undergraduate students were questioned on 
whether a set of mental and biological properties continue after 
a character is killed in an accident. Results show that “those who 
believe in some form of life after death (and, to a certain extent, 
even those who do not) implicitly represent dead agents’ minds 
in the same way: psychobiological and perceptual states cease 
while emotional, desire, and epistemic states continue” (Bering, 
2002, p. 263). Even participants that described themselves as 
“extinctivists” (i.e., personal conscience ceases with death) 
showed a tendency to attribute more continuity to epistemic, 
emotional, and desire-based states, as compared to biological, 
psychobiological, and perceptual states. This study showcases 
how one’s reflective ideas concerning the discontinuity of all 
functioning after death, might be overridden by mind intuitions, 
giving rise to implicit assumptions of continuity of some mental 
functioning after death.
In another line of research, Harris and Giménez (2005) 
have reported that people appear to commonly operate with 
two different perspectives about death: a secular perspective 
in which death involves the cessation of all bodily and 
mental functions; and a metaphysical perspective, in which 
death is conceived as a metamorphosis, where bodily life 
discontinues and a new life begins that is not constrained 
by biological processes. These different perspectives on 
death appear to be distinctly elicited in different contexts. 
Thus, Harris and Giménez (2005) presented two narratives 
(secular and religious) to a group of 7- and 11-year-olds, 
from a public school in an urban city in Spain. The 
secular narrative described the death of a grandparent in a 
secular/medical context and the religious narrative described 
death in a metaphysical/religious context. After each story, 
children were asked to judge and justify the functioning 
or non-functioning of various bodily and mental processes 
after the grandparent’s death. Children were more likely to 
judge that certain processes continue after death when they 
were questioned in the context of the religious as opposed 
to the secular narrative. They were also more likely to claim 
that mental processes continue functioning after death as 
compared to bodily processes, regardless of the narratives 
presented. The results showed that both age groups hold a 
dual conception of death as a biological endpoint on the one 
hand, and as a metaphysical transformation on the other.
To see if this pattern held up in a different cultural 
setting, Astuti and Harris (2008) conducted a similar study 
with Vezo tribes in rural Madagascar. They tested children, 
from 8- to 17-years-old, and adults from 19- to 71-years-old. 
Participants were presented to a secular (corpse) narrative 
and a religious (tomb) narrative, where a character dies. 
They were then asked whether bodily and mental processes 
continue after death. Participants often claimed that processes 
cease at death (discontinuity theory of death), however such 
claims were more frequent for bodily processes than mental 
processes, and more frequent among the secular narrative 
(i.e., the corpse narrative) than with the religious narrative 
(i.e., the tomb narrative). This pattern was consistent across 
the different age groups. Similar results were also observed 
by Roazzi, Dias, and Roazzi (2010) on a replication of this 
study in Brazil.
Literature looking at the reasoning of children and 
adults about the afterlife, that is, about the nature of dead 
agents (such as ghosts) seems to indicate that an implicit 
theory of mind is projected onto the inferences they make 
about these supernatural agents. The evidence presented 
supports the view that human beings are naturally intuitive 
dualists. According to Bloom (2004), Cartesian dualism 
assumes a crucial distinction between res extensa, our 
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physiological machinery, and res cogitans, which refers to 
our minds and our thoughts. In other words, “we use our 
bodies to experience and act on the world, but we ourselves 
are not physical things, we are immaterial souls” (Bloom, 
2004, p. 11). Bloom advanced his argument by stating that 
we are natural Cartesians and that due to this fact dualistic 
thinking comes naturally to us, making us think of bodies and 
minds as distinct (Bloom, 2004). On this basis, not only do 
we process God and ghosts using an implicit theory of mind, 
but also concepts of soul and spirit are similarly viewed 
as essentially derivative of the concept of mind (Bering & 
Bjorklund, 2004; Bloom, 2004).
Cohen and Barrett (2008) took this argument a step 
further to give an account of spirit possession. They 
wanted to explore possible cognitive factors influencing the 
cross-cultural incidence of spirit possession concepts, to 
gain a more refined understanding of an intuitive mind-body 
dualism in terms of a supernatural kind of action. Towards this 
end, Cohen and Barrett looked at how English undergraduate 
students reason about the effects of a hypothetical 
mind-migration across a set of behaviors. These behaviors 
consisted of behavioral judgments that hinge heavily upon 
physical and not mental aptitudes (e.g., appetite, strength, 
speed, visual acuity) contrasted with behavioral judgments 
not tightly anchored to particular physical attributes (e.g., 
math competency, sociability, emotionality). They presented 
participants with a set of hypothetical mind-transfer 
scenarios in which the mind of one person (A) is transferred 
into the body of another person (B), the host. Participants 
were asked to reason about the new post-transfer person’s 
behaviors and aptitudes. The results showed that the majority 
of participants reasoned that while the post-transfer person’s 
performance on physical tasks (e.g., sprinting) would be 
similar to the host’s (B), whereas the performance on mental 
tasks (e.g., math) would be similar to the person whose mind 
had been transferred (A). Thus mental characteristics seem 
to be attributed to the incoming agent, while characteristics 
that are physical in any way are attributed to the host’s body, 
implying that physical aptitudes aren’t implicitly assumed 
to travel during the migration. Moreover, participants 
overwhelmingly assumed the mind to transfer completely 
(all or nothing) instead of partially. Thus one gets the whole 
mind as a package.
This data lines up with Bloom’s claim of Cartesian 
dualism; once participants clearly distinguished mental from 
bodily behaviors and aptitudes, transferring the mental, and not 
the bodily attributes. In addition, participants tended to infer 
a complete displacement of minds, such that the post-transfer 
person’s performance on mental task items was reasoned to 
be identical to incoming person’s performance. On this basis, 
they hypothesized that spirit possession is naturally conceived 
as mind possession, consisting of a complete displacement of 
mind properties from one body to another.
Up to this point, the dominant view is that that the 
ontology of immaterial agents commonly emerges from an 
intuitive theory of mind. Considerable evidence reviewed 
above supports the view that human beings are naturally 
intuitive dualists, which provides the basis for imagining 
the possibility of mind as a mental-causal organization 
functioning independent of the physical-causal constraints 
of the body. On this basis, concepts of soul and spirit are 
viewed as essentially derivative of the concept of mind 
(Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; Bloom, 2004).
More Than Mind: A Case for Soul and Spirit
In spite of the empirical evidence that points to a 
theory of mind as being the underlying intuitive base that 
drives inferences of supernatural agency, recent work in 
the field has suggested that there is something more than 
mind at the heart of religious conceptions. This suggestion 
was first raised in studies on adults and children’s 
intuitions of soul. The assumption in the field was that 
the concept of soul was basically grounded in an intuitive 
understanding of mind. Questioning this assumption, 
Richert and Harris (2006) compared children’s inferences 
about the soul with their inferences about the mind and 
brain. They asked children how mind, brain, and soul are 
affected by a religious ritual (baptism) and how different 
kinds of functioning – cognitive, non-cognitive, and 
biological – would continue without the presence of the 
mind, brain, and soul. Their results indicate that children 
believed mind and brain change and grow over time, 
in contrast, the soul remains constant and is devoted to 
predominantly, spiritual functions (i.e., moral purpose, 
connecting to the divine life-giving force both in life and 
afterlife, and love). In a second study, Richert and Harris 
(2008) explored adult’s conceptions of the ontological and 
functional properties of the mind as compared to the soul. 
The existence of the mind was generally tied to the human 
lifecycle of conception, birth, growth, and death, and was 
primarily associated with cognitive (i.e., problem solving, 
thinking, telling right from wrong, memory) as opposed to 
spiritual functions (i.e., life force, afterlife, connection to 
higher power, spiritual essence). In contrast, the existence 
of the soul was less systematically tied to the lifecycle 
and frequently associated with spiritual as opposed to 
cognitive functions.
Based on their findings, Richert and Harris (2006, 2008) 
have argued that the concept of soul develops independently 
from the concept of mind, claiming that children and adults 
conceive of the soul more as the enduring essence of a person, 
while mind consists of changing mental competences.
Just as the concept of soul does not appear to reduce 
to the concept of mind, Roazzi, Nyhof, and Johnson (2013) 
have proposed that the concept of spirit may have still other 
intuitive roots. Cohen and Barrett (2008), in their work on 
spirit possession, argued that it is intuitively processed as a 
mind possession, thus equating mind to spirit. In contrast, 
Roazzi et al. (2013) argued that the concept of spirit 
originally refers to the vital force of life. In this account, 
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spiritual ideas do not primarily emerge from concepts of 
mind and agency, but from concepts of life and energy. This 
definition is shared by many religious and philosophical 
traditions, but it doesn’t mean that people readily conceive 
the spirit in this fashion. Anthropological accounts also 
portray people’s concepts of spirit as being similar to that 
of a supernatural agent, such as a ghost (Cohen, 2007). To 
examine these differences Roazzi et al. (2013) tested adult’s 
inferences about mind and soul as well as spirit. Their study 
was the first to compare intuitions about these three concepts 
together in the context of considering how different cultures 
and religions may recruit similar or different intuitive ideas. 
Methodologically, the study was built on the hypothetical 
transplant/transfer methods employed in previous research 
(Cohen & Barrett, 2008). Undergraduate students from 
Brazil, Indonesia, and the USA were presented with a 
series of conditions where one character’s soul, mind, or 
spirit transfers to the other character’s body. These different 
conditions involved the transfer of different attributes of 
human functioning – cognitive, bodily, social, and moral. 
Given the dual interpretation of spirit as being either an 
agent (mental kind) or a vital energy (vital kind), characters 
initially differed in either a level of ability (i.e., skill) or level 
of passion (i.e., energy) for the attribute being transferred. 
Participants were then asked to judge if the transfer yielded 
either a complete, partial, or no transfer of the highlighted 
attribute being measured. The results point to differences 
as well as considerable overlap of participants’ conceptions 
of mind, soul and spirit, along with influences of culture 
and religion. Across countries, the mind tended to be more 
associated with ability and cognitive attributes, while soul 
and spirit were relatively more associated with passion and 
social and moral attributes. These findings are consistent 
with Richert and Harris (2006, 2008), who also reported 
evidence of the mind being more associated with cognitive 
abilities, while the soul was more associated with moral and 
spiritual qualities. In addition, soul and spirit were more 
distinctly related to religious influences. However, spirit was 
not distinctly associated with passion (energy). Instead, the 
data suggest that passion/energy is equally an integral part of 
concepts of mind, soul, and spirit. The authors concluded that 
the three disembodied agents – soul, mind, and spirit – held 
both a mental dimension and an energy dimension.
These findings, along with findings reported by Richert 
and Harris (2006, 2008), seem to point to a yet richer set 
of intuitive origins that involve not only a basic intuitive 
theory of mind, but also involve intuitions pertaining 
essence and energy.
The goal of this paper is to examine the development of 
an intuitive understanding of vital energy (vitalism) further 
exploring how it extends to spiritual thinking. However in 
order to advance towards this goal, it is important to first 
grasp a better understanding of what this reasoning process 
evokes. Roazzi et al. (2013) revealed that intuitions on 
energy don’t necessarily hold a one to one correspondence to 
either mind, soul, or spirit. In addition, the authors claim that 
their results were limited to the language terminology that 
they used, as they come to capture these terms. Furthermore, 
their measure of energy was limited, focusing only on a 
persons’ personal engagement in a given activity. Results 
yielded from Roazzi et al. (2013) raise deeper questions 
about what vital energy is, how it is conceptualized, and how 
it should be studied, thus calling for a more careful look at 
the concept of vital energy (versus spirit) as it is represented 
across cultures.
The following is a short review of how this concept 
is and has been represented in different historical and 
cultural contexts. Information yielded from this review will 
illustrate how people seem to think about energy in different 
cultural contexts, hence facilitating a later assessment of its 
developmental origins in early cognitive development.
Vital Energy - Across Time and Cultures
Concepts that refer to vital energy aren’t new to 
humankind. These concepts have been represented in 
many cultures and across time in ways that are culturally 
significant and appropriate. In Chinese philosophy ch’i 
(qì) refers to an energetic fluid, which vitalizes the body, in 
particular as the breath, and which circulates outside us as 
the air (Edwards et al., 2011).
The concept of qì has a wide array of interpretations and 
usages (Mayor & Micozzi, 2011). Despite this variability, qì 
is recurrently referred to as a breath or vapor, as a creative 
force, as divine flow, that comes to embraces multiple 
properties, such as physical, psychic, emotional, spiritual, 
and even mystic properties (Roazzi, 2012). In everyday 
life, qì is to be cultivated and/or accumulated in order to 
achieve enlightenment and a long life (Mayor & Micozzi, 
2011). As an example, breathing techniques, meditation and 
martial arts (such as Tai chi chuan) are ways in which one 
can heighten qì force.
Comparable to the Chinese notion of qì is the 
Indian Ayurveda concept of prana, conceived as a vital, 
life-sustaining force of living beings that is believed to flow 
through a network of fine subtle channels in one’s body 
(Amritanshuram et al., 2013). One can cultivate prana with 
the practice of yoga, meditation, and breathing techniques. 
The Ayurveda representation of prana seems to endow it 
with properties that influence one’s physical, mental, and 
spiritual well-being.
In Afro-Brazilian religions we find yet a different 
representation of the vital energy principle, named axé. 
African slaves that came from Yoruba traditions brought this 
concept to Brazil. It is defined as an invisible force that is 
magical and sacred and fundamental to all existence, both 
physical and spiritual (Cohen, 2007). Axé can be sowed, 
cultivated, shared, used (spent), and even renewed. To 
receive axé, means to incorporate material and symbolic 
representations of the vital principle both from a physical 
world (aiye) as well as its correlates from a spiritual world 
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(orun), meaning there is always a constant interplay of axé 
between both worlds. In the physical world, axé is energy that 
can be found in the animal (e.g., human and animal blood), 
vegetal (e.g., dendê oil and honey), and mineral (e.g., copper, 
bronze, and gold) kingdoms. Thus Afro-Brazilian religious 
groups, such as Candomblé and Umbanda, describe axé as a 
magical force that acts upon not only one’s biological health, 
but also one’s spiritual and psychological well-being.
Finally, in Inca culture, there are two terms referring 
to energy, hucha, a heavy, dense black energy, and sami, a 
high frequency, light, subtle energy that comes from being 
in harmony with the universe (Dollman, 2013). According 
to Roazzi (2012) Sami is permeated in the natural world, 
animating all living beings and passing on ‘power’ to natural 
objects and places where it accumulates. An increased 
amount of Sami in one’s body is correlated with a life of 
harmony and well-being with others and the natural world. 
Hucha, in contrast, is created by human beings, naturally 
accumulated through human action and interaction and 
human emotions. Accumulation of hucha energy is not 
desired because it affects ones physical, emotional, mental, 
and spiritual states. As an example, when someone became 
sick they were assumed to be full of hucha, acquired due to 
selfish attitudes. A high amount of hucha does not allow the 
flow of sami in one’s body, leading the person to become 
physically sick. In this case, the energy of human agency 
(hucha) is sharply contrasted with vital energy (sami).The 
examples depict the different ways in which cultures seem 
to recruit thinking in terms of vital energy, thus generating 
these diverse representations. As proposed by CSR, there 
is a common intuitive core underlying this variety of ideas. 
It is not clear what this common intuitive core is, but what 
can be drawn from these examples is that in spite of cultural 
diversity, peoples’ concepts of vital energy are being 
elicited to understand/explain biological, psychological, 
and spiritual processes.
To advance further understanding of vital energy, theory 
and research need to target three core issues: (a) what are the 
intuitive foundations of people’s concept of vital energy?; 
(b) how do these concepts develop?; (c) how or when does 
one’s cultural environment recruit these intuitive ideas to 
later generate a reflective concept of vital energy?
The first two issues target the underlying intuitive 
foundation of concepts of vital energy and its development. 
Literature looking at children’s understanding of vital energy 
is scarce, and the work available seems to highlight vital 
energy as a concept that is inherently part of the domain of 
biology. Research on children’s understanding of vital energy 
emerged in the field of cognitive development, specifically 
in literature looking at children’s naïve biology. Two 
Japanese psychologists, Kayoko Inagaki and Giyoo Hatano, 
initiated this research agenda. In their investigations on how 
children reason in the domain of naïve biology, Inagaki 
and Hatano (2002) claimed that young children possess 
a causal-explanatory framework exclusively grounded in 
naïve biology. This causal-explanatory mechanism received 
the name of vitalistic causality and is portrayed as being an 
implicit or intuitive theory children come up with in order 
to explain biological phenomena. Research from the field of 
naïve biology suggests that young children reason in terms 
of vital force or vital energy as an unidentified energy that is 
an integral part of biological functioning (Inagaki & Hatano, 
2002). Literature has also shown that later in development 
children substitute vitalistic causality as a whole for more 
culturally appropriate causal-explanatory mechanism, i.e., 
mechanistic causality, which is grounded on today’s scientific 
rationale (Schlottmann, Cole, Watts, & White, 2013). The 
question that remains unanswered is whether thinking in 
terms of vitalistic causality is dropped completely or if it is 
shifted or recruited to explain other kinds of phenomena that 
aren’t biological in nature.
Putting Things Together
Past theory and research in CSR was built on the notion of 
an implicit theory driving people’s intuitions on supernatural 
agency. Studies looking at beliefs in afterlife and spirit 
possession have narrowly focused on demonstrating that 
people rely on an intuitive theory of mind when reasoning 
about supernatural agency. Results from these studies 
succeeded in supporting this conclusion. New advances in 
the field that tried to detach from this narrow focus, found 
that there seems to be other intuitive domains involved on 
peoples reasoning over supernatural agency, such as an 
intuitive understanding of essence and vital energy.
Given these new findings, a shift in the direction of 
future theory and research was necessary. Thus a new 
agenda in the field of CSR, seeking to account for other 
intuitive domains associated with intuitions on supernatural 
agency, was proposed by Cohen and Barrett (2011). This 
new agenda for framing future studies in this field, focuses 
not necessarily on agency per se, but reframes it in a more 
holistic way, highlighting the nature of personhood as being 
at the core of peoples intuitive reasoning about supernatural 
agents and human agency in general. This new theoretical 
view first emphasizes personhood as holding different 
elements, especially mentality (mind/agency), vitality (vital 
energy) and identity (essence). Intuitions on mentality would 
be anchored on intuitive psychology (theory-of-mind), 
intuitions on vitality would be anchored on intuitive biology 
and intuitions on essence would be anchored on some sort of 
essentialist or biological intuitive theory. Second, the authors 
suggest that these components are typically combined in 
conceptualizing a person but may be activated in different 
ways depending on varying concepts, contexts and cultures. 
Thus, cultural settings will influence the recruitment of 
different patterns of personhood. This would explain why 
some people might process the concept of spirit as operating 
solely in their intuitive domain of biology, viewing it as a 
vital force of life that sustains biological functioning, while 
others might process the concept of spirit as being an agent, 
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associating it to a ghost, activating possibly their intuitive 
domain of biology and psychology simultaneously.
In order to advance knowledge in the field of CSR it is 
important to gain a better understanding of these proposed 
components of personhood. There is a developed research 
agenda looking at the component of mentality (Bering & 
Bjorklund, 2004; Harris & Giménez, 2005) and some new 
advances have been made looking at intuitions on personal 
essence (Richert & Harris, 2006, 2008). However there is a 
limited amount of work addressing the component of vitality. 
The field’s ultimate goal is to study what role do intuitions 
about vital energy play on how people process supernatural 
concepts. Though, before advancing research in that direction, 
it is important to first understand the origins and development 
of a concept on vital energy, further investigating how they 
are later recruited in different cultural contexts.
Building on work reviewed so far, this paper aims to set 
the framework for future research on vital energy, addressing 
core issues. As a first step, it’s important identify what early 
concepts of vital energy look like. Are these early concepts 
founded in an intuitive biology? Or are these concepts used 
to explain phenomena across domains from the beginning?
Furthermore, it is important not only to study people’s 
concepts on vital energy early in life, but also look at its 
development. Thus future methodologies should target 
various age groups, making use of either cross-sectional 
or longitudinal designs, to investigate how these intuitions 
change throughout development, and what the factors are 
that might affect this process.
To address the question of whether a concept on vital 
energy starts of as bounded to a naïve biology, or if it is 
recruited to explain phenomena in various domains, one 
of the first objectives of future research in this field lies in 
exploring if reasoning in terms of energy transfer/flow (not 
organ intentionality) extends beyond the domain of biology, 
and specifically if and at what stage of development it 
extends to the domain of psychology.
Finally, the anthropological examples suggest that 
adults later in life reason reflectively about vital energy 
across domains; however this claim remains to be tested 
empirically. In testing this, adults’ reflective and intuitive 
concepts on vital energy should be targeted, enabling a 
comparison of how different cultures recruit these ideas, 
highlighting similarities and differences. Furthermore, 
given that CSR is invested in understanding what common 
core culture recruits from, an additional question concerns 
if culture is in fact recruiting from basic intuitions when 
eliciting these ideas.
In studying the development of this concept, what are 
other things we need to know about vital energy? Two key 
questions are: what is the source of vital energy? and what 
does it affect? In both cases it is necessary to study the domain 
from which this vital energy is assumed to come from and the 
domain it is affecting. Past research (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002) 
has been limited to studying vital energy originating from 
sources such as rest, food, and water, affecting ones biological 
body. Given the review of examples of how different groups 
of people reason about vital energy, it makes sense to 
advance studies on vital energy affecting ones biological and 
psychological, as well as spiritual well-being.
Furthermore, vital energy has been portrayed in 
different cultural settings as originating from different 
sources. In an attempt to organize this knowledge, one could 
assume that these sources can be natural, self-psychological, 
social-psychological and spiritual. As an example, natural 
sources of vital energy are air (through breathing), food, 
sunshine, and water. Qi and prana are examples of how 
some cultures represent energy as coming from these natural 
sources. Self-psychological sources of vital energy can be 
represented as activities that somehow “vitalizes you”, such 
as exercising your body or maintaining good thoughts. As an 
example, hucha for the Incas represented a negative valence 
of vital energy that was generated by, for example, selfish 
thoughts and actions. Social-psychological sources of vital 
energy can be represented as activities in which someone 
receives energy from another person. For Afro-Brazilian 
religions, one can receive positive vital energy from another 
person by means of speech. Finally, spiritual sources of energy 
could come from activities that imply some connection with 
a higher reality, such as praying, meditating, and drinking 
holy/blessed water.
To know from which domain adults and children 
assume vital energy to come from as well as what they 
assume it is going to affect, future studies should address this 
issue carefully. These studies need to examine not only what 
people assume the origins of the vital energy to be, as well 
as whether they assume one source as more charged with 
energy than others. Furthermore, it is possible that children 
and/or adults are significantly more likely to recruit certain 
sources of vital energy for specific targeted effects, possibly 
assuming that natural sources of vital energy only affect 
the physical body, whereas social-psychological sources of 
energy hold the capacity to affect both the physical body as 
well as one’s psychological state. Finally, this study should 
be framed in a way that explores how these reasoning 
processes may vary across cultures.
Results stemming from this developmental line of 
research, targeting both children as well as adult populations, 
would yield a better understanding of how this thought 
process develops, and if people assume it affects ones mental, 
bodily and/or spiritual well-being. If it is assumed to affect 
the mental/psychological as well as the spiritual domain, this 
could lead to potential new insight on how people reason 
intuitively about supernatural kinds.
This research would yield more empirical data to 
support Cohen and Barrett’s component view of personhood 
as implicitly guiding people’s intuitions on supernatural 
agency. This would provide a better understanding of the 
assumption that personhood likely entails multiple intuitions 
of immaterial kinds (including inferences about agency, 
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energy, and essence), and how these intersect on people’s 
intuitions over terms like mind, soul, and spirit, as they 
inhabit the same conceptual space of immaterial identity.
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